The main historical archive of all tropical storms, subtropical storms, and hurricanes in the North Atlantic Ocean, Caribbean Sea, and Gulf of Mexico from 1851 to the present is known as the Atlantic hurricane database (HURDAT), which is the fundamental database for meteorological, engineering, and financial studies of these cyclones. Previous work has demonstrated that a reanalysis of HURDAT is necessary because it contains many random errors and systematic biases. The Atlantic Hurricane Reanalysis Project is an ongoing effort to correct the errors in HURDAT and to make HURDAT as accurate a database as possible with utilization of all available data. For this study, HURDAT is reanalyzed for the period 1944-53, the first decade of the ''aircraft reconnaissance era.'' The track and intensity of each existing tropical cyclone in HURDAT are reassessed, and previously unrecognized tropical cyclones are discovered, analyzed, and recommended to the HURDAT Best Track Change Committee for inclusion into HURDAT (existing tropical cyclones may be removed from the database as well if analyses indicate evidence that no tropical storm existed). Changes to the number of tropical storms, hurricanes, major hurricanes, accumulated cyclone energy, and U.S. landfalling hurricanes are recommended for most years of the decade. Estimates of uncertainty in the reanalyzed database for the decade are also provided.
Introduction
In this paper the reanalysis of the Atlantic hurricane database (HURDAT) is explained for the period 1944-53, which is the first decade of aircraft reconnaissance. The main objective of the Atlantic Hurricane Reanalysis Project (AHRP) is to improve the accuracy and completeness of HURDAT (or, at the very least, to understand and quantify the existing biases). New data sources have become available recently containing observations from past decades, and it is essential that all available observations from these sources are utilized for the reanalysis. Landfall parameters for U.S. landfalling hurricanes are provided because many of the intensities have not been specified at landfall and are not accurate.
HURDAT contains many errors and systematic biases (Landsea et al. 2004a (Landsea et al. , 2008 . When the original database was constructed, the position and intensity of tropical cyclones (TCs) were estimated only twice daily (at 0000 and 1200 UTC) during the 1944-53 period. The 0600 and 1800 UTC positions and intensities were interpolated (Jarvinen et al. 1984; Landsea et al. 2008 ).
This interpolation often created intensity inaccuracies for landfalling hurricanes. As in Landsea et al. (2008) , which describes the reanalysis of the 1911-20 Atlantic Ocean hurricane seasons, it was found here that for numerous TCs during the first decade of aircraft reconnaissance that the translational velocities at the beginning and/or the end of TC tracks often showed unrealistic accelerations or decelerations because of the digitization of hand-drawn track maps back in the 1960s during the compilation of the original HURDAT. Some of the systematic biases appeared in the original HURDAT because the understanding of TCs was not as advanced as it is today. For example, knowledge of pressure-wind relationships and knowledge of how wind speed changes with height in TCs were both limited. Another systematic bias is that the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale (SSHWS) (Simpson 1974; Schott et al. 2010 ) categories for U.S. hurricane landfalls, first assigned by Hebert and Taylor (1975) , do not match up with the maximum wind speed at landfall (Landsea et al. 2008) . This is because those original designations were based on central pressure, whereas today, the SSHWS category is determined by maximum wind speed. For the reanalysis, detailed landfall parameters are analyzed and added to HURDAT including consistency between the maximum wind and the Saffir-Simpson category at U.S. landfall.
In addition to reanalyzing each TC listed in the HURDAT from 1944 to 1953, a thorough search was conducted for TCs that existed but were not originally listed in HURDAT. When a potential TC not existing in HURDAT is identified, analyses of all available data from all sources are conducted. If these indicate that the system in question is likely a TC that was previously missed and therefore undocumented in HURDAT, it is then recommended for inclusion into the database.
Position and intensity uncertainty estimates for the reanalysis are provided. It is shown that uncertainty varied tremendously from case to case since there are huge variations in the amount of observations available. Because of this, uncertainties for this reanalysis are quantified for each general observational type available (low-level aircraft penetration, aircraft circumnavigation, no aircraft flights, etc.).
The HURDAT contains the recommended positions and intensities of all recorded Atlantic basin tropical storms, subtropical storms, and hurricanes from 1851 to the present. Prior to this study, the AHRP has been completed and approved by the HURDAT Best Track Change Committee (BTCC) for the years 1851-1930, as well as Hurricane Andrew of 1992, and these changes have already been made available to the community (Landsea et al. 2004a (Landsea et al. ,b, 2008 (Landsea et al. , 2011 . Preliminary research has already been conducted for the years 1931-43, and the BTCC is currently reviewing these years. The current study discusses recommended changes for the years 1944-53. Although this study only focuses on the reanalysis of HURDAT from 1944 to 1953, it is important to understand how observational practices have evolved over time. Since 1851 the observational network has generally become more dense with more ship measurements and station reports, and new tools and technology have been created for better monitoring of TCs. Prior to the aircraft reconnaissance era, TCs that stayed far away from any land areas would only be noticed and recorded if a ship encountered the storm at sea. Thus, 1944 marked the advent of a new era in substantially improved monitoring of Atlantic basin TCs.
Methodology a. Data sources
Many sources of data are utilized for the reanalysis. Some of the data sources utilized for the reanalysis of 1944-53 that were also utilized for the reanalysis of the 1911-30 period include the Historical Weather Maps series (HWM); the Comprehensive Ocean-Atmosphere Dataset (COADS) (Woodruff et al. 1987) ; articles, tables, charts, and maps from the Monthly Weather Review (MWR); Original Monthly Records (OMR) of U.S. coastal stations from the National Climatic Data Center (NCDC); monthly climatological data summaries from NCDC; meteorological observations from Caribbean islands and Mexico maintained by their respective governments or weather services; newspaper articles, reports and personal accounts in publications such as Barnes (1998 Barnes ( , 2001 and Tucker (1995) ; as well as other sources such as Connor (1956) , Dunn and Miller (1960) , Harris (1963) , Schwerdt et al. (1979) , Jarrell et al. (1992) , and Perez Suarez et al. (2000) . For more information regarding those data sources, see Landsea et al. (2004a Landsea et al. ( , 2008 . Sources for the reanalysis are separated into two categories-primary sources (e.g., HWM, MWR, COADS, and NCDC observations) and secondary sources (e.g., newspaper articles, Barnes, and Tucker) . Much more emphasis and trust are placed in primary sources. More emphasis is placed on actual official meteorological observations rather than on verbiage and commentary.
New data sources utilized for AHRP beginning in the 1940s and 1950s include National Hurricane Center (NHC) microfilm of synoptic weather maps, the U.S. Navy hurricane logbooks, also referred to as Annual Tropical Storm reports (ATS) (e.g., U.S. Navy 1950 Navy , 1951 Raftery 1953; Minter 1954) , and the U.S. Air Weather Service (AWS) reports (e.g., U.S. Air Weather Service 1948 Service , 1949 Service , 1951 . The microfilm synoptic maps, which are kept back to the early 1940s, were constructed operationally by the U.S. Weather Bureau forecasters. These analyzed maps were utilized as part of the foundation for hurricane forecasting. The microfilm synoptic maps from every 6 h are available in most cases except for TCs in the eastern half of the Atlantic. South of about 258N, the eastern edge of the microfilm map was about 558W. This may be because microfilm maps did not extend beyond the range of aircraft reconnaissance. For U.S. landfalling hurricanes, hourly microfilm maps are usually available. Microfilm is the major source of aircraft reconnaissance information utilized from 1944 to 1949 and is one of the most important sources of aircraft information from 1950 to 1953 as well. Communications and messages between the hurricane forecasters in the Weather Bureau office and the flight crew on the reconnaissance aircraft in the TC are often displayed in the corners of the microfilm maps. In addition to the abundance of aircraft information available on the maps, these maps often contained additional ship observations that were not in COADS. The utilization of the microfilm maps along with HWM and COADS is necessary for the reanalysis process and has led to numerous changes made to HURDAT. The U.S. Air Weather Service reports and the U.S. Navy hurricane logbooks are vital as well, but these are not available for the first few years of aircraft reconnaissance. ATS reports are available every year from 1950 onward and thus were utilized for the reanalysis of the 1950-53 seasons. AWS reports utilized in the reanalysis of the 1944-53 hurricane seasons include reports with information on the 1947, 1948, and 1950 hurricane seasons. The AWS report on 1950 was extremely detailed.
b. Pressure-wind relationships
Typically, as the central pressure of a TC decreases, the maximum wind increases. There was little knowledge of and there were no publications on relating central pressure to maximum wind speed prior to Kraft (1961) . Several subsequent updated pressure-wind relationships have been published up to Brown et al. (2006 .4 ship), with 1.0 per year of these less than 950 mb (0.9 aircraft and 0.1 ship). These statistics indicate that central pressure observations were more routinely available for tropical storms and Category 1 and 2 hurricanes after the initiation of aircraft reconnaissance. However, the number of only ship-based central pressure observations in the eye of strong hurricanes did drop from being rare early in the twentieth century to nearly nonexistent after aircraft reconnaissance became available, likely due to better monitoring and communication, allowing ships to avoid the eyes of strong hurricanes.
c. Aircraft reconnaissance
The first year during which routine planned military aircraft reconnaissance missions were conducted into Atlantic hurricanes and tropical storms was 1944 (Sheets 1990; Summer 1944; Porush and Spencer 1945) . Different types of aircraft were utilized for reconnaissance missions during the first decade of aircraft reconnaissance. The U.S. Army Air Force (AAF) operated four B-25 aircraft in 1944/45 (Porush and Spencer 1945) . The U.S. Air Force (formerly the AAF) operated B-29 aircraft from 1946 to beyond 1953, and the B-17 was also utilized for reconnaissance during 1947 (Sheets 1990; U.S. Air Weather Service 1948 , 1949 . The U.S. Navy used a version of the B-24 called the PB4Y-1 Liberator in 1944/45 (Porush and Spencer 1945; D. Reade 2010, personal communication) . In 1946 the U.S. Navy switched to the PB4Y-2 Privateer aircraft for low-level hurricane reconnaissance. The PB4Y-2 was the aircraft that was utilized the most by the U.S. Navy for Atlantic hurricane reconnaissance from 1946 to 1953, and in 1953, the U.S. Navy added the P2V aircraft to complement the PB4Y-2 (C. Neumann 2010, personal communication) . The U.S. Navy also operated a PB-1W aircraft (the U.S. Navy version of the B-17) equipped with Airborne Early-Warning (AEW) radar starting in 1947 as an extra aircraft utilized only for U.S. hurricane landfall threats (U.S. Air Weather Service 1951; D. Reade 2010, personal communication). The PB-1W flew primarily at night to obtain position fixes.
Important instrumentation on most of the reconnaissance aircraft during the first decade of aircraft reconnaissance included a height altimeter, pressure altimeter, and drift meter. The surface pressure at the location of the aircraft is considered accurate to within 2-3 mb on average when the plane is flying at 1500 ft (1 ft ' 30.5 cm) or lower. The drift meter aids in determining the flightlevel wind speed. Different aircraft contained different types of radars, but many suffered greatly from precipitation attenuation. The two types of aircraft radars that had the least attenuation were the AEW radar and the AN/APS-20 (Airborne Search and Detection) radar that was installed on the P2V aircraft beginning in 1953 (D. Reade 2010, personal communication).
Aircraft reconnaissance navigation was accomplished by a method called dead reckoning (DR). Using the DR method, the navigator would note the time and position of the last island or coast seen before flying to intercept the TC. Every 30 min the navigator calculated the new position of the aircraft based on the speed and direction the aircraft was traveling during the previous 30 min. Once the periphery of the TC was reached, the new position would be calculated every 15 min. Most flights during the 1940s and many flights during the early 1950s used the TC azimuthal winds as a tail wind to gradually circle closer to the center of the TC before deciding whether to perform penetration or to simply circumnavigate the storm. Because of the frequent heading changes in high wind conditions, navigators often fell behind in their position calculations (C. Neumann 2010, personal communication) . The navigational position error was dependent on the distance from the TC to any coast/ island and on the amount of time spent by the aircraft in high wind conditions. Aircraft center fix position accuracy could also be aided by intercepting loran (radio) signals.
The aircraft must have been in a location where radio signals could be intercepted and was available on roughly one-quarter of the flights to improve upon the DR position fix. Although DR was used on all reconnaissance flights, whenever loran was available, positions are considered more accurate than when loran is not available.
Significant errors in positioning, which were rather common, contributed directly toward substantial flightlevel wind calculation errors. In concordance with drift meter measurements for measuring flight-level wind, the navigator calculated the flight-level winds every 15 min along with the position based on the speed that the aircraft should have been traveling and the extra distance covered as a result of the tail wind on the aircraft as it slowly circled toward the center of the TC (C. Neumann 2010, personal communication) . However, the considerable uncertainty in the location of the plane precluded accurate total distance measurements and thus also the flight-level winds. For this reason, flight-level wind measurements contained significant errors that increased with increasing winds (H. Willoughby 2010, personal communication). The U.S. Navy, which was very influential in hurricane forecasting and besttrack preparation from 1946 to 1964, placed considerable reliance on the maximum wind reports from the aircraft. These highly uncertain guesses were often placed into the official best tracks and are the values found in the original HURDAT (C. Neumann 2010, personal communication) . Flight-level winds are not considered to be a particularly reliable aid for reanalyzing the HURDAT intensity until the installation of the inertial navigation systems on the P-3s in the mid1970s (Sheets 1990 ) and on the U.S. Air Force planes around 1990. For this reason, only a small weighting is placed on the flight-level winds for the reanalysis of intensity from 1944 to 1953 (although the data were considered and fully analyzed in all cases).
In addition to the flight-level wind measurements, surface winds were analyzed by the aerologist through viewing the sea state during low-level flights (below cloud base) during the day. Surface wind speed estimates did not suffer from the same type of inaccuracies as the flight-level winds because navigational error did not factor into surface wind estimates. However, the surface winds were subjective estimates whereas the flight-level winds were measured semiobjectively, as described above. There was no standardized way to determine wind speed from the sea state until the publication of a photograph catalog in 1952 linking wind speed to sea state (Neumann 1952) . A photograph from this publication corresponding to reported 70-kt surface winds is shown in Fig. 1 . A large limitation to this catalog, however, was the lack of calibration of these visual conditions with actual measured wind speeds, especially for winds above a Category 1 hurricane. Winds below minimal hurricane force from this catalog likely are better constrained by observed winds, due to its basis on the Beaufort Scale (Kinsman 1969) . The Beaufort Scale, created by Sir Frances Beaufort in 1806, is a wind force scale based on the sea state, which was used by ship captains to generally describe the force of the wind (Kinsman 1969 ). Sea states above force 12 (hurricane force) cannot be readily ascertained by visual clues only, and thus force 12 was assigned to hurricane force wind speeds. The same practice was adapted in official military coding messages with regard to aircraft reconnaissance. The aircraft would report surface wind speed at the location of the aircraft if the sea state was visible and was not obscured by clouds. The highest number that could be reported in the military coding was 12 (641 kt). If a higher surface wind speed was observed, the aerologist on the flight would use plain text to deliver his wind speed estimate to the Joint Hurricane Warning Center in Miami, Florida, but this information sometimes was not communicated, was inaccurate, or was not available. The average uncertainty in surface wind speed estimates for wind speeds lower than about a Category 2 hurricane is believed to be about 15 kt, and the error was likely higher in high wind speed conditions. There was also likely a high bias of several knots, which will be discussed later. Owing to the numerous factors that can increase the inaccuracies in estimated surface winds, it is assumed that the errors in the estimated surface winds and the errors in the flight-level winds are of a similar magnitude on average. Both types of aircraft winds were not very reliable and are only weighted lightly for making changes to the original HURDAT intensity.
The types of flight patterns utilized by aircraft for hurricane reconnaissance can be separated into two types-low-level penetrations and circumnavigations. When aircraft are able to penetrate the eye or center at low levels, a central pressure can be reported. An example of a low-level penetration from 1948 Storm 5 by a U.S. Navy reconnaissance aircraft in the north-central Gulf of Mexico is shown in Fig. 2 . When a central pressure is available, this value is converted to a wind speed using the Brown et al. (2006) pressure-wind relationships. An eye diameter was often reported by the aircraft, which can be converted to an RMW using the Kimball and Mulekar (2004) relationships. The eye diameter along with the environmental pressure, size, and speed of the storm is used to make adjustments of 60-10 kt to the Brown et al. pressure-wind relationship, if necessary, to determine maximum wind speed. For the reanalysis of 1944-53, determining the intensity using the pressure-wind relationship plus the adjustment factor is generally considerably more accurate and reliable than using the much more uncertain surface wind speed estimates and flight-level wind speed measurements.
On nearly all flights for major (Category 3, 4, and 5 on the SSHWS) hurricanes and many flights for minor (Category 1 and 2 on the SSHWS) hurricanes, the cyclone was not penetrated for one of two reasons. The first is that the decision would sometimes be made not to penetrate past about the 70-kt isotach because it was believed to be too dangerous to attempt to penetrate farther. For example, for the Hurricane Dog reconnaissance flight on 4 September 1950, the decision had been made to circumnavigate the cyclone because previous flights had advised against penetration due to the extreme intensity of the storm (U.S. Navy 1950) . The second reason is that, even when they attempted to penetrate the center, they often would be forced to abort the penetration before the RMW or eye was reached because of severe turbulence causing the aircraft to become uncontrollable. There may have also been many times when the storm appeared destructive but may have been less extreme than peripheral observations suggested to the flight crew, though it is difficult to determine how often that occurred. When penetration was not performed, the circumnavigation flight technique was usually conducted. A classic example of the circumnavigation flight technique from a flight in 1948 Storm 3 on the afternoon of 29 August 1948 is shown in Fig. 3 . Although 25 aircraft center fixes were obtained for the storm (Fig. 4 ), none were obtained by penetration. Thus, no central pressures were obtained for the entire lifetime of the storm. Circumnavigation was a common flight pattern used for major hurricanes. During circumnavigation, a center position was estimated, but there is little that can be used for the intensity reanalysis as there were no central pressures reported during circumnavigation. For this reason, very few central pressures indicative of major hurricane intensity were reported during 1944-53. Aircraft central pressures were only reported during daylight hours due to the need to visually see the ocean surface and primarily in tropical storms and minor hurricanes. Beginning in 1950 penetrations were generally attempted more often and for somewhat stronger hurricanes compared with the late 1940s (roughly a SaffirSimpson category stronger on average). Nevertheless, it was still a common occurrence in the 1950s for a plane to attempt a penetration and have to abort before the RMW or even the inner core was reached due to extreme turbulence causing the plane to become uncontrollable.
There were additional changes that came about in 1950 as well. Although the B-29 was utilized by the U.S. Air Force beginning in 1946 for Atlantic hurricane reconnaissance, 700-mb penetrations began being performed much more often beginning in 1950 for many TCs east of ;708W (U.S. Air Weather Service 1951; U.S. Navy 1950). The 700-mb height in the eye would often be reported beginning around 1950. Extrapolation of surface pressure from 700 mb was not performed since temperature data outside the aircraft were not yet available during the early 1950s. Extrapolations of 700-mb heights to obtain surface pressures without temperature data are considered to have errors too large to be counted as central pressure values in HURDAT. However, a table (Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorological Services and Supporting Research 1999) was utilized that displays central pressure values given a 700-mb height and a 700-mb temperature. Since temperature data were not available, this information yields a possible range of central pressures, which is useful. Also, 1950 was the first year that dropsondes were used regularly in the Atlantic for TC monitoring. Information regarding the surface pressure encountered by the dropsonde just before splash landing was received by the plane crew. However, there was no wind information or position information for the dropsondes, so these surface pressures cannot be assumed as central pressures as many of them would splash under the eyewall or even outside of the eyewall (H. Willoughby 2010, personal communication). Nevertheless, the combination of reported 700-mb heights and dropsonde pressures complemented accurate central pressures from lowlevel penetrations to provide more intensity information than was available during the 1940s. Performing penetrations and obtaining central pressures were not the highest priorities during the first decade of aircraft reconnaissance, especially from 1944 to 1949. The most important priority was locating the position of the center (and thus determining a direction and speed of movement). Secondary priorities included estimating or measuring the maximum wind speed of the cyclone, estimating the size of the storm, reporting eye diameter (when possible), central pressure or lowest pressure encountered, cloud type, and perhaps writing a short description of how well the center is organized (U.S. Air Weather Service 1948 Service , 1949 Service , 1951 . It was generally known by meteorologists during the first decade of aircraft reconnaissance that, as the maximum winds in a hurricane increase, the central pressure should decrease, but specific knowledge of pressure-wind relationships did not exist until Kraft (1961) . It was common for a central pressure to be reported with a maximum wind estimate, which was 20 to sometimes more than 40 kt above what the central pressure would suggest according to the Brown et al. (2006) pressure-wind relationship. There has been no systematic change to the way aircraft central pressures have been observed and reported from the 1940s to today. A height altimeter along with a pressure altimeter were used both then and today along with the extrapolation technique. There have, however, been many significant changes to the way the maximum wind speed has been measured, estimated, and reported by aircraft reconnaissance (Sheets 1990; Franklin et al. 2003) .
In cases for which the center could not be penetrated after an attempt, the aerologists commonly reported intensities from 100 to more than 120 kt, even if the maximum visual surface wind and maximum flight-level winds encountered were significantly lower than that reported value. A quote from the U.S. Navy Annual Tropical Cyclone report for Hurricane Dog of 1950 provides an example of a maximum intensity guess that was made on 6 September 1950:
''As in previous flights into this storm, no penetration was planned because of the severity of the turbulence. . .it was considered desirable and adequate to circumnavigate at approximately the 70 kt wind circle. Features of this flight include the observation of the extremely large swells ahead of the hurricane, and the extent of hurricane winds over a very large area. It is believed that highest winds near the center were probably in excess of 150 kt'' (U.S. Navy 1950).
These practices often led to many high biases in reporting maximum winds, which had been documented for the 1940s-60s in HURDAT previously (Landsea 1993) . During many penetration cases, the maximum flightlevel wind encountered would often be reported as the storm intensity, leading to additional high biases in the original HURDAT since the maximum flight-level (400-1000 ft) wind encountered during penetration cases is usually substantially higher than the maximum surface winds in a TC (Franklin et al. 2003) .
d. Reanalysis steps
There are several systematic steps that are included in the process of reanalyzing the HURDAT for each year. This process is described in detail in Landsea et al. (2004a Landsea et al. ( , 2008 and is briefly summarized here. The first step is to obtain all available raw observations and compile them into a single database. Both the HWM and microfilm synoptic weather maps are scanned and printed out so as to plot all observations from all sources onto a single synoptic map corresponding to a specific time.
Observations are plotted onto the synoptic maps one to four times daily for each storm, depending on the amount of data available on a particular day. After the synoptic observations are plotted and the observation database is completed, a metadata file is composed for every TC. The daily metadata paragraphs include descriptions of synoptic analyses and contain key observational data. Next, the reanalyzed positions and intensities for each storm for every six hours are carefully chosen. Changes are made to HURDAT only when available observations provide enough evidence that the previous HURDAT position or intensity is in substantial error (roughly at least 0.28 latitude and/or longitude for position and at least 10 kt for intensity). After the HURDAT tracks and intensities have been reanalyzed, a paragraph summarizing the reasoning for significant changes is added to the end of the metadata for each TC.
After the existing TCs during a year are reanalyzed, a thorough search is conducted for potential missing TCs (referred to as suspects) using synoptic maps as well as all other available sources. There were only a few suspects for which there were aircraft reconnaissance flights, so most of the data and methodology for adding new storms in HURDAT is explained in Landsea et al. (2004a Landsea et al. ( , 2008 .
In addition to surface data from ships and land stations, the reanalysis of the 1944-53 hurricane seasons utilizes aircraft data and land-based radar data for the track analysis. Landsea et al. (2004a Landsea et al. ( , 2008 describe the methodology for determining the reanalyzed track in the absence of aircraft reconnaissance and radar data. However, for the period of 1944-53, aircraft data were available on more than half of the days of all recorded TCs. For recorded TCs west of 558W from 1947 onward, aircraft flights were performed on more than three-fourths of the days. An aircraft center fix is a position estimate of a TC from an aircraft flight. When determining the track, all aircraft center fixes for the entire lifetime of the TC are obtained. The center fixes are then interpolated to 6-hourly positions, placing more weight on the more reliable center fixes. The center fixes from 1948 Storm 3 are shown in Fig. 4 . Next, all ship data are analyzed to determine whether the positions suggested by the aircraft center fixes are accurate as aircraft navigation, especially far from land, could contain sizeable errors. Occasionally, reliable ship data near the center revealed evidence that the aircraft fix position was significantly in error. However, for many TCs, there were multiple aircraft center fixes each day with sparse ship coverage, and the reanalyses for these cases relied primarily on aircraft information. Beginning in 1950, the operational hurricane forecast center of the U.S. Weather Bureau and the U.S. Navy conducted postseason analyses and drew a best track for all storms. Interestingly, the original HURDAT positions often do not match this best track. Indeed, data available in this reanalysis have shown positions from both sources to be inaccurate on several occasions.
Reanalysis results and discussion
All changes to HURDAT shown here are preliminary and have not yet been approved by the HURDAT Best Track Change Committee. The results shown here are the changes that we are recommending to the committee. Users of HURDAT should either wait until the committee has approved the reanalysis of 1944-53 or utilize these results with caution. The metadata containing all of the detailed changes recommended for each individual TC are found in Hagen (2010).
a. Overall activity
Recommended changes to the number of tropical storms and hurricanes, hurricanes, major hurricanes, and accumulated cyclone energy (ACE) for each year are shown in Table 1 . Twenty-one additional tropical cyclones were identified and are proposed to be added into HURDAT during these 10 years with one proposed removal, bringing the total number of TCs for the period from 103 to 123 (an increase of 2.0 per year). Vecchi and Knutson (2008) estimated about 0.9 missed storms per year, on average, during the period 1944-53 because of a lack of data, which assumed that the entire COADS ships database had been utilized for detecting Atlantic basin tropical storms and hurricanes. After the reanalysis, which has now thoroughly utilized the COADS database and added in about two new TCs per year, the Vecchi and Knutson (2008) estimate of 0.9 missing TCs per year becomes valid. This means that we were able to obtain data that found two-thirds of the total missing storms. Eighteen of the 21 additional TCs were tropical storms, and three were hurricanes. These three new hurricanes, along with one previous tropical storm that is reanalyzed to be a hurricane and two previous hurricanes that are reanalyzed to, instead, be tropical storms, tentatively increases the total number of hurricanes for the 10-yr period from 64 to 66 (an increase of 0.2 per year). The number of major hurricanes tentatively decreased from 36 to 27 (a decrease of 0.9 per year). Ten hurricanes previously listed in HURDAT as major hurricanes are preliminarily revised downward in intensity to minor hurricane status, and one minor hurricane is preliminarily increased to major hurricane status. Seven of those 10 major hurricanes are reanalyzed downward owing to evidence of overestimation of winds by aircraft reconnaissance. Those seven cases are a small Tables S1-S9 at the Journals Online website http:/dx.doi.org/10.1175/ JCLI-D-11-00419.s1). During the first decade of aircraft reconnaissance, of the 21 new TCs introduced into HURDAT, roughly half of these occurred in the western half of the basin (or within the range of aircraft reconnaissance) and the other half occurred mainly in the eastern half. The greatest reasons for missed cyclones in the western half of the basin are due to changes in analysis techniques and designation practices. A secondary reason is that more data has recently become available for detecting these cyclones. For cyclones in the eastern half of the basin or in locations where aircraft reconnaissance was not available, the primary reason for missed cyclones was a lack of real-time (or operationally available) ship data for detecting these cyclones. The COADS ship database remains the most useful data source for locating evidence of missing TCs in the eastern half of the basin during the reanalysis of the first decade of aircraft reconnaissance. Table 4 shows that there are 17 U.S. landfalling hurricanes (1944-53) with proposed changes to the SSHWS category that impacted one or more states/ regions. Changes are made to the maximum U.S. landfall category for eight of these hurricanes, with two downgrades by one category and six upgrades by one category. One system that was originally listed as a major hurricanethe 1944 Great Atlantic Hurricane-was downgraded from a peak Category 3 to a Category 2 impact, making the system a minor hurricane at landfall. A system that was originally listed as a minor hurricane-1949 Storm 11 that made landfall near Freeport, Texas-is upgraded from a peak Category 2 to a Category 3 impact, making the system a major hurricane at landfall. The five most intense U.S. landfalling hurricanes during this 10-yr period in terms of wind speed all made landfall in the southern Florida counties of Palm Beach, Broward, Miami-Dade, Monroe, and Collier. The analyzed landfall intensity of all five of these hurricanes is (1945 Homestead: 115 kt, 1947 Fort Lauderdale: 115 kt, 1948 Everglades City: 115 kt, 1949 Palm Beach: 115 kt, and Hurricane King of 1950, which made landfall at Miami: 110 kt) in the range from 110 to 115 kt (a high-end Category 3 to a low-end Category 4). The Palm Beach hurricane of 1949 is tentatively upgraded from a Category 3 to a Category 4 at landfall. However, the wind speed in HURDAT is lowered from 130 to 115 kt. This is a typical example of the inconsistencies between HURDAT and the SSHWS category for U.S. landfall. The 1945 Homestead hurricane is another example of an increase in Saffir-Simpson category from 3 to 4 but a decrease in wind speed from 120 to 115 kt. Table 5 lists all hurricane landfalls and impacts (1944-53) for land areas outside of the continental United States. Many of these hurricanes made direct landfalls; however, several others passed close enough to islands or countries for hurricane force winds to be experienced on land without the center crossing the coast. Those hurricanes are included in this list as well and contain the maximum wind likely experienced on land as calculated by the Schwerdt et al. (1979) model in the absence of information that contrarily indicates a higher or lower intensity. There were no landfalling Category 5 hurricanes analyzed, but countries that experienced one or more major hurricane impacts during the decade include Cuba (3 major hurricanes), The Bahamas (3), Jamaica (2), Mexico (2), and Antigua and Barbuda (1). Bermuda experienced a Category 2 impact four times during the 10-yr period.
b. U.S. tropical storms and hurricanes

c. Hurricane impacts outside of the continental United States
Two of the hurricanes with the largest impacts for countries outside of the United States were the Cuba hurricane of October 1944 and Hurricane Charlie of 1951, which affected Jamaica and Mexico. The former developed in the southern Caribbean on 12 October, affected the Cayman Islands from the 14 to 16 October with Category 2 conditions and then made landfall in western Cuba on 18 October as a Category 4 hurricane. The intensity was increased from 105 to 120 kt for the Cuban landfall based on two pieces of data. A 937-mb central pressure was measured on land near the time of landfall and, as the cyclone was exiting the north coast of Cuba, a 122 kt (25 s averaged) wind was recorded at Havana. This hurricane killed 300 people in Cuba (Perez Suarez et al. 2000) . Hurricane Charlie of 1951 was a classic straight-mover through the Caribbean that originated from an easterly wave in August. It made landfall in Jamaica near Kingston with an analyzed intensity of 110 kt (an increase from 95 kt originally). This hurricane killed 152 in Jamaica, injured 2000, left 25 000 homeless, and caused $65 000 000 (U.S. dollars) of damage on that island (Norton 1952) . The hurricane then made landfall in the Yucatan Peninsula of Mexico as a 115-kt hurricane, where 70% of crops were destroyed. After emerging into the Bay of Campeche, Charlie's final landfall occurred at Tampico, Mexico, also as a major hurricane. This last landfall caused at least 100 deaths and $1 160 000 in damage. In total, hurricane Charlie caused at least 250 deaths and $75 000 000 in damage (Tannehill 1956 ). Figure 5 shows the frequency of reported available aircraft central pressures. One central pressure observation represents one aircraft penetration for which a central pressure was reported. All aircraft observations of less than 960 mb for the entire decade regardless of whether they are a central pressure are listed in Table 6.  A threshold of 960 mb is chosen for this table because this value is about the general cutoff for major hurricane intensity according to the Brown et al. (2006) pressurewind relationships. These pressure-wind relationships also indicate that a value near 945 mb is the borderline between Category 3 and 4 intensity. A 920-mb central pressure is a general approximation for the borderline of Category 4 and 5 intensity. There were very few pressure readings indicative of major hurricanes compared to the number of major hurricanes that existed previously in the original HURDAT during this decade. From 1944 to 1953 there were five hurricanes for which a Category 4 intensity was confirmed by an aircraft pressure measurement. This number compares with 16 Category 4 or greater hurricanes listed in HURDAT originally and 14 shown in the reanalyzed HURDAT for this 10-yr period. There was one hurricane for which a Category 5 intensity was assigned in the reanalysis based on an aircraft central pressure measurement of 929 mb reported along with a tiny RMW of 3 n mi (1953 Hurricane Carol) . This number compares with three Category 5 hurricanes listed in HURDAT originally and one shown in the reanalyzed HURDAT for the 10-yr period. For two of the TCs previously listed as Category 5 hurricanes (1950 Hurricane Dog and 1951 Hurricane Easy), aircraft pressure information available at least once per day indicated maximum wind speeds substantially below the Category 5 threshold at the time HURDAT originally listed Category 5 intensity. Category 5 wind speeds were likely placed into the original HURDAT because of the maximum wind speed guesses by the onboard aerologist for those two hurricanes. For 1947 Storm 4, Category 5 wind speeds were placed into the original HURDAT owing to a 140-kt surface observation in the Bahamas, but multiple sources indicated that it was an estimated-not a measured-wind. This wind speed is found in the reanalysis to be too high based on other information that indicates a likely central pressure in the range of 944-951 mb on that day. Whenever there was no central pressure measurement to justify an intensity change, no change would be made to the HURDAT intensity, but several of the major hurricanes were downgraded because the central pressure information indicated a weaker intensity. However, it is highly likely that the true number of extremely intense hurricanes is underrepresented in the revised HURDAT file due to the infrequent sampling of the highest winds and/or central pressure in these extreme hurricanes.
d. Aircraft central pressures
The analysis is an average of the south of 258N and the 258-358N relationships. As previously stated, the original wind speeds in the best track were often taken directly from the aircraft reconnaissance wind speed estimates, which are not reliable observations. This method is not a fully representative data sample because for TCs that were major hurricanes in reality central pressures were observed much less frequently. For TCs that were tropical storms and Category 1 hurricanes in reality, central pressures were observed much more frequently. The results of the method are shown in Table 7 and Fig. 7 . For times when aircraft reconnaissance reported . ''Wind at coast'' is the peak estimated (1 min) surface (10 m) winds to occur at the coast at landfall/closest approach. ''Revised max wind'' is the maximum wind in the revised HURDAT at the time of landfall or point of closest approach. ''Original max wind'' is the maximum wind in HURDAT that was originally provided at the point just prior to landfall or point of closest approach. Nonlandfalls are denoted by an asterisk. New hurricanes to HURDAT are indicated by the ampersand symbol. HURDAT is not zero according to this analysis, the value of 12.7 kt is significantly improved over the value of 113.3 kt indicated by the original HURDAT maximum winds for cases when central pressures listed in the revised HURDAT are due to aircraft reconnaissance pressure information only.
f. Subjectively derived reanalysis uncertainty estimates
Estimates of the average position and intensity uncertainties for HURDAT for the first decade of aircraft reconnaissance are shown in Tables 8 and 9 along with estimates for the period 1851-1930 provided in Landsea et al. (2008 Landsea et al. ( , 2012 . The last two rows in Tables 8 and 9 are subjective estimates from an average of the NHC hurricane specialists for recent time periods. For position, open ocean cases without aircraft showed only slight improvements from the early decades of the HURDAT era. This decrease in uncertainty is solely due to an increase in ship traffic from the 1800s to the middle of the twentieth century. The position improvement is much more significant in recent years because of the widespread monitoring of the whole basin provided by geostationary satellites. Average position uncertainty on days with reconnaissance fixes is estimated to be about 35 n mi during the first decade of aircraft reconnaissance, and this improved greatly with the inertial navigation system a few decades later. Average position uncertainty for settled areas of the coastline for U.S. landfalling hurricanes showed significant improvement from the nineteenth century. This is largely due to the numerous (sometimes hourly) aircraft center fixes that were usually provided during the last day or so leading up to a U.S. landfall. Also, the coastal radar network was beginning to be developed during the late 1940s, and by 1950 there were at least four land-based radars in operation along the coastal areas between Texas and Virginia. These radars were located at Boca Chica (NAS), Florida; Freeport, Texas; Norfolk, Virginia; and Gainesville, Florida (Gentry 1951) .
The intensity uncertainties in HURDAT are stratified similarly to those for track except the aircraft reconnaissance group is divided into two groups: one for which central pressures were measured and the other when they were not measured (Table 9 ). There was a significant difference in the average uncertainty between the two TCs that were actually 120 kt and higher are likely underestimated in intensity since the most intense part of the storm was not sampled. To test this hypothesis, statistics from a companion Category 5 study (Hagen and Landsea 2012) are utilized. For all times that extreme hurricanes from 1992 to 2007 were at or above a 120-kt intensity, the actual NHC best-track intensity is subtracted from the intensity value that likely would have been analyzed for these systems given the reconnaissance technology available in the late 1940s and early 1950s. This mean difference is 10 kt, which is thus indicated in Table 10 .
Summary and conclusions
The first decade of aircraft reconnaissance was an active period for Atlantic hurricanes, especially with respect to impacts in the United States and Caribbean. The number of tropical cyclones was significantly increased as a result of the reanalysis, as 21 TCs were added during the decade. However, the number of major hurricanes and accumulated cyclone energy were decreased as a result of the reanalysis due in large part to overestimation of winds from aircraft reconnaissance in the original HURDAT. Hundreds of track and intensity changes to HURDAT are recommended to the BTCC. Although one or more major track alterations are only recommended for 37% of the existing TCs of the decade, one or more major intensity changes are recommended for 49% of existing TCs.
HURDAT position and intensity estimates from 1944 to 1953 are substantially more accurate than the estimates for the period 1851-1930 due largely to aircraft reconnaissance. The most significant bias that existed during the first decade of aircraft reconnaissance was the tendency for aircraft to overestimate the wind speeds in many TCs. For flights during which a central pressure was measured, this bias is eliminated. Ship traffic was more dense in many areas of the basin during the 1940s and 1950s compared with the second half of the nineteenth century. This assisted in having a more complete record of TC frequency, but not necessarily TC intensity as ships did their best to avoid sampling the most intense portion of TCs. Although there likely have been some storms that were missed (even after this reanalysis), the intensity accuracy in HURDAT is perhaps a more alarming issue than the number of TCs that remain unaccounted for. Several missed TCs were found in this reanalysis, but the average intensity uncertainty was likely improved only slightly due to the low number of aircraft central pressures observed, the limitations of the Brown et al. (2006) pressure-wind relationship, and the lack of reliable flight-level and surface wind observations from aircraft.
In conclusion, the primary goal of this paper is to provide documentation of the Atlantic Hurricane Reanalysis Project for the first decade of aircraft reconnaissance . Aircraft reconnaissance equipment, techniques, TABLE 9. Average intensity uncertainty estimates in the reanalyzed HURDAT for different time periods stratified using different observation methods (Landsea et al. 2008 (Landsea et al. , 2012 procedures, and limitations have been described. A results summary as well as detailed uncertainty estimates for the reanalyzed positions and intensities has been provided. An important point of this paper is to demonstrate the limitations of the HURDAT, especially with regards to TC intensity analysis accuracy. This research suggests that for many cases, the intensities listed in HURDAT (at least through 1953, and likely beyond that year) are not nearly as reliable as intensity estimates today.
TABLE 10. Average intensity error bias estimates in the reanalyzed HURDAT for different time periods stratified using different observation methods and by actual storm intensity only for when aircraft reconnaissance flights did not report central pressure values (Landsea et al. 2008 (Landsea et al. , 2012 
